darkness" (tamokkhandha) that this process of rebirth can be stopped. 5) Since avijjd and moha are synonyms -this could be seen from a full quotation of the Itivuttaka text just mentioned -it follows that a definition of the latter is equal to a definition of the former. In the Dhammasangani we find moha defined in the following manner:
Nescience concerning dukkha (and the other Truths); nescience concerning the past (and) the future (and both); nescience concerning this being conditioned by that (idapaccayata) among things dependently arisen (paticcasamuppannesu); such nescience concerning wrong view, insufficient understanding, not knowing the truth... non-restraint, non-penetration concerning foolishness, stupidity, non-attention, delusion, bewilderment, infatuation, ignorance, the flood of ignorance... delusion concerning the root of evil.
(Dhs., para. io6I).
With the existence of these and other texts it is small wonder that avijja has found itself coupled with various derogatory epithets. For example, it has been called "the direst of bonds" (samma bandhana), 6) "the greatest stain" (avijja paramam malam); 7) and in a parable in the Sunakkhatta-sutta reference is made to the "ill-effect of the poison of ignorance" (avijjavisadoso). 8) Finally, we have it put to us that ignorance is the main reason for the moral decay of a man; and, conversely, knowledge is the reason for his release:
Knowledge is the best among things that arise;
Ignorance is foremost among things that fall. (S. 1.42).
How then does one give up ignorance and gain knowledge? The answer is to give up the ignoble path which is dominated by sensual lust, and an overpowering desire to possess wealth and property, which are conventionally described as pleasant, and which are seen by the unlearned lay-man to have an intrinsic ability to make him happy and contented. For the Buddhist ignorance is almost entirely made up of the various shades of the conventional truth that the world is, on the whole, a good place in which to be. In order, therefore, to destroy this superstition, the Buddha and his followers resorted to giving a literal -and thus an unrefined -description of that which is possessed by 5) Itv., p. 8. 6) M. II.44. 7) A. IV. 95 and Dhp., v. 243. 8) M. 11.256. all: the body. As a consequence of this phenomenological standpoint two results will accrue. The body of a woman will no longer be desired, and thus one of the prime urges in man will have been avoided. Also, in realising what must be termed the virtual obscenity of actually existing, the other prime urge will be avoided: that of self-preservation. This last assertion is made on a more literal and wider basis that it would have in the West. To put it another way: there would be no desire to preserve the self both in this life and in others following, neither in this world nor in the various heavens. With this, of course, will be included the destruction of any desire to obtain the so-called material advantages in the world. And all this renunciation leads not only to the gaining of knowledge, but also to the loss of worries and griefs. 9)
All that has been said in the preceding paragraph can be summed up in the two Pali expressions kama-tanhd and bhava-tanhd, that is, respectively, "craving for sensuous pleasures" and "craving for becoming". But there is one other form of craving left (in this context), and that is vibhava-tanha, "craving for non-becoming". It is true that the ultimate aim of the Buddhist is to attain nibbtna, and therefore not to be reborn any more. But the subtle paradox exists that this must not be desired, since desire or craving is a thing of this world, and its existence in the mind, whether it be for things in this world, or for nibbana, or for annihilation, will achieve the same result: rebirth. If then, through knowledge (in the Buddhist sense) the individual can erase his craving, it is only then that he can work toward not being reborn.
In the Anguttara Nikaya there is a text which states that there is no beginning to avijja: Bhikkhus, the beginning of ignorance is not perceived, so that it may be said: 'Formerly ignorance did not exist, then afterwards it arose'. (A. V. I3).
This text, taken indiscriminately out of context, could easily suggest that avijja is some cosmic primaeval cause of the world. And it would follow, therefore, according to this argument, that special significance may be given to the P-s., since this begins with avijjd. Such was the view of Schayer, who referred to the P-s. as a "kosmische Emanations-9) See Sn., vv. II06-II07.
formel" degraded into a "primitiv Biologie". 10) However, the remainder of this text shows the fallacy of this theory: "But it may be perceived that ignorance is dependent on this (or that)". 11)
More specifically, it is further stated that ignorance occurs because there are the five hindrances, which are in turn dependent on the three wrong actions (tini duccaritani) in thought, word and deed.
In summing up, avijja can be stated to be ignorance of the Four Truths, the Eightfold Path, the impermanence of all things in the world, of what craving for material things actually entails, and ignorance of the P-s. 12) Ignorance does not allow one to see the world, and man's state in it, as they really are. On the other hand, the essence of knowledge is to see the world divorced from preconceived and conventional notions. This leads to dispassion and the giving up of any wish to obtain material possessions. 13)
Sankh.ara
This term is a difficult one, both in the matter of translation and in interpretation. Concerning the latter, we will be looking at several texts in order to arrive at some explanation. But with regard to the former, the task seems a formidable one; and Dr. Stede's words are more appropriate than ever.
The translations of the other terms in the P-s. vary little, if at all. But with this term it seems that each scholar chooses his own translation. There are, therefore, many examples that could be cited. The following are but a few of those that the present writer has found: impressions, conformations, formations, dispositions, aggregates, mental activities, volitional acts, composite-unity, pre-natal forces, co-operating forces, synthesis, karmic form-energy and affirmations.
Two eminent scholars, G. P. Malalasekara and W. Stede, have similar opinions concerning a translation of this term. The former describes it as "a difficult word to translate, since it means various things in various contexts", but its etymological meaning may be given io) "Vorarbeiten zur Geschichte der mahayanistischen Erlisungslehren" in as "what is put together as a composite thing". 14) And Dr. Stede's opinion is that sankhdra (and viii~ana) cannot be translated at all, "since the reality underlying these concepts baffles understanding." 15) Nevertheless, an attempt will now be made to try to find some word(s) which, with the necessary qualifications, will be of some service in the translation of this very enigmatic term.
In S. 11.4 there are said to be three sankharas: the sankhdra of the body (kayasankhdra), the sankhdra of speech (vacisankhara) and the sankhdra of thought (cittasankhdra). With this text in mind the beginnings of a translation for sankhara suggests itself: "sustenance". The reason for this suggestion is that, so far at least, the main idea is that of supporting and nourishing, so to speak. Without the sustaining power of these states, the body, mind and speech would not continue. The last quotation is followed by Visakha asking concerning "the attaining of the cessation of feeling and perception" (saiiiiacvedayitanirodhasamapatti). Dhammadinna replies that the bhikkhu is led naturally into this state by his mind without his thinking about it. As he enters this state the sankhdra of speech ceases first, followed by that of body and then mind. On his leaving this state the respective sankharas return to him in the reverse order. There is nothing astonishing about this matter -indeed, the order is the logical one -except that it is admitted here that a bhikkhu, who is capable of attaining trance, possesses sankhdras; and yet a glance at the P-s. will show that from the cessation of avijja there should come the cessation of the sankharas. In addition to this, even the Buddha is shown as possessing sankharas: "Als er ein bestimmtes Wunder tun wollte, 'gestaltete er einen solchen auf das Wunder gerichteten Sankhara', dass die betreffende Wirkung erreicht wurde." 16) Furthermore, in the MahMparinibbanasutta the Buddha, at his last meeting with Mara (the Evil One), tells him that within a short period of time he would leave the world. After this we are told: "Then the Bhagavan ... being conscious and mindful, gave up the sustenance of life (ayusankhdra) ..." 17) From this and other texts we are then to suppose that not all the sankharas are given up when avijja is destroyed. The sankharas sustaining the physical existence of the body in this life continue, but only in the fashion of a potter's wheel which will continue to spin for a short time after the potter has finished his task.
Our understanding of this problem is further helped by the following text: The Buddha then continues in the same vein for several forms of existence that the bhikkhu may desire. Finally, however, the bhikkhu wishes for release through thought and insight (cetovimutti, panniavimutti), which entails the extinction of the "influxes" (dsavas). Because of his success in this matter -due ultimately, it must be added, to his possession of the five previously mentioned sankhras -"the bhikkhu is not reborn anywhere, he is reborn nowhere". 18) Two points may be drawn from this text. The first is that there are sankharas which can be a positive aid to release from rebirth. The second point is that the bare term "sustenance" is not by itself sufficient to translate sankhdra. The present writer would therefore suggest that "volitional sustenance" brings out better the meaning of the word. It is the will to do any action that has played a paramount role in Buddhism. That which sustains the body, for example, is the breath, because if the body was without this for even a short period of time it would die. Also, as can be seen from the bhikkhu's ability to attain trance, the breath, although among ordinary lay-people it is a reflex action, is still under the control of the will since it can be stopped. And more clearly, deliberation, reflection, perception and feeling are mani- Finally, two further texts may be referred to in support of the suggestion that sankhdra should be translated -if at all -by "volitional sustenance". In S. 11.66 it is said: That which one thinks (ceteti), bhikkhus, that which one determines (pakappeti), and that which obsesses one (anuseti), this is the condition for the continuance of consciousness.
In another context argument might be made concerning whether this text was extant before or after the formulation of the P-s. with twelve terms. Such a matter need not concern us at this time, however, since in either case the text still shows that sankhCra includes not only volition but also sustenance, for the text continues: "When there is this condition, then there is the support for consciousness." And in S. 111.96-97 two things are said concerning sankhara. The first is that the "consideration" (samanupassanda) of the man who sees the body as atta ("self") is a sankhara. The man's volitional activity, therefore, sustains him for as many rebirths as he holds this opinion. It is also stated that the sankhdra is born from craving (tanha). It is thus easy to consider how craving can give rise to a certain attitude of mind which entails the wish, i.e., the will or volitional act to obtain something, given in the first instance that the man possesses the delusion concerning the body, that it is a beautiful thing, which necessarily discolours his view of the material world.
ViRidna
As with sankhara, viiin~ na is capable of more than one interpretation. One of these, which is supposed to be specifically concerned with the P-s., is given as follows:
And what, bhikkhus, is consciousness? There are, bhikkhus, these six groups of consciousness: eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness and mind consciousness. (S. 11.4).
However, the validity of this interpretation -in the context of the P-s. -may be disputed. Strictly speaking, this is the discriminating consciousness that is found described in various texts. As such it is a part of the already existing psycho-physical entity. It distinguishes (vijanati) happiness (sukha), dis-ease (dukkha) and lethargy (adukkhamasukha); and if there is any difference between this and understanding (paiin~), then it is that the latter should be developed and the former should be accurately known. 19) On a more mundane level, so to speak, it further distinguishes different sorts of taste, such as sour, bitter, acidic, honey, alkaline and non-alkaline, salty and non-salty tastes. 20) It is, therefore, this consciousness which is meant in the following text:
From the arising of name-and-form (there is) the arising of consciousness; (but) from the cessation of name-and-form (there is) the cessation of consciousness (by means of the eightfold path). (S. 11I.64).
For the P-s. to make any sense, therefore, the viniinana which is the third unit should properly be patisandhi-vindina, "rebirth-consciousness". And it is this consciousness which is referred to in the Mahdniddna-sutta, which deals with the P-s. with nine terms: On the following pages it transpires that the consciousness which the Buddha is referring to is that which arises from the eye, ear, etc. 21) Therefore, it could be suggested that he is contradicting Sati on two points. The first is that there is no stable, transmigrating consciousness.
The second is that consciousness is entirely dependent on the psychophysical entity for its arising, and is called by the name of the particular sense-organ concerned. But the consciousness that Sati seems to have been referring to is that which is found in the Mahdnidana-sutta quoted above. Therefore, the answer to his assumption is not the correct one. It is not that he believed in the existence of a rebirth-consciousness that was his mistake, but that he regarded it as an unchanging and permanent entity. To give the proper answer to Sati's assertion reference can be made to an Itivuttaka text, which states that "consciousness is of the nature of fading away" (vinianam viragadhammam). 22)
As a means of relating these two concepts of viniana, the following text may be quoted:
A monkey goes about this five-doored hut, It wanders around by (each) door, Beating repeatedly against (them). Stand, monkey, do not run away; For you it is not to be as it formerly was; By wisdom (paiinnya) you are restrained, You will not go into the future (again). (Thag., vv. 125-126).
The interpretation of this simile is quite straightforward. The monkey is consciousness, which is constantly related to the five sense organs of the eye, ear, etc.. But an enlightened person has control over this ordinarily capricious faculty, hence its former habits are curtailed, and it is checked from running forward into the future at the death of that person. We thus find in this text an intrinsic connection between rebirth-consciousness and the consciousness which discriminates the various phenomena in the material world. But this should not be regarded as a contradiction to that which has been previously stated, i.e., that the composer of S. 11.4 is wrong. The rebirth-consciousness that must be meant in the P-s., since it is prior to the psycho-physical entity, is nevertheless also found in the latter as a preparation for a new being, and its function is enhanced by its connection with that consciousness which is bound up with the sense organs.
The text given below, taken from the Visuddhimagga, 'explains' the process of rebirth:
Being bent by craving and thrown by the activities by way of continuity, it abandons the former basis like a man who crosses a conduit by hanging to a rope tied to a tree on the hither bank, and proceeds by the causes such as the object and so on, reaching or not reaching the latter basis set up by karma. And here the preceding consciousness is called decease because it passes away; the latter consciousness is called rebirth because it is connected with the beginning of another existence. But the consciousness does not arrive here from a previous existence; nor does it appear from thence without a condition such as karma, activities, the bending onto the obiect and so on: The echo may be (taken) and such similes. Because the series is continuous, There's no identity nor otherness. 23)
The last line is further explained by noting that if all things remained the same there would, for example, be no such thing as curds from milk; and if things differed completely from each other, again there would be no curds.
Ndmarupa
The more common translation for this term is "name-and-form"; and this may be kept for the additional reason that it is the more literal It can be seen that sankhara and consciousness are missing from this definition. But if the matter were pressed, it could be allowed that cetana and sankhara were synonyms if reference is made back to S. III.60. 24) And in S.11.94 vinnina and mana are also synonyms:
Bhikkhus, that whirh is called thought (citta), mind (mana), consciousness (viinana), the unlearned lay-man is not disgusted with, is not apathetic towards, is not freed from.
The word manasikdra is made up of the locative form of mana, plus a word which comes from the verb karoti, thus giving the literal translation of this compound word as "production (or "application") of the mind". This, plus the more usual translation "attention", both point to a man's faculty of discrimination, which is the prime characteristic of vinn~ana.
Briefly, then, nama can be taken as referring to the process of ideation within the individual.
The meaning of rfpa, "form", is obvious. It is the body of the individual which is formed in the womb, and on which basis the six senses are founded.
Salayatana
The definition of this term may be given thus:
What, bhikkhus, are the six sense organs? (They are) the eye-organ, the earorgan, the nose-organ, the tongue-organ, the body-organ (and) the mindorgan. (S. 11.3).
And those things that correspond to these six inner (ajjhattika) sense organs, i.e., those things that occur outside of them, but are related to them (bahir&ni ayatanani) are the "sphere of forms" (rapayatana), the "sphere of sounds" (sada-), "...tastes" (rasa-), "... smell" (ghanda-), "... tangibles" (photthabba-) and "...mental images" (dhamma-).
To state the obvious, within the twelvefold P-s. the sa.lyatana depend on name-and-form. But it would seem, from a text found in the Mahalanhasankhaya-sutta of the Majjhima, that these do not become active properly until a later stage in the life of the individual, sometime after parturition. First the child is breast-fed, and this is followed by the stage of playing children's games: It is through his six senses, therefore, that the unlearned lay-man finds what he believes to be pleasure and delights, which he lusts for and craves after. 25) Thus it can be seen that restraint with regard to these senses is of paramount importance. 26) There are three things that can be said about each of the sense organs. The first is that happiness (sukha) and joy (somanassa), which sometimes arise because of them, lead to the enjoyment (assddo) of the particular sense organ concerned. This, therefore, gives the individual a false set of values, because the other point that can be made about them is that they are impermanent (anicca), of a changeful nature (viparinamadhdcmma), and give distress or dis-ease (dukkha 
Phassa
The more usual translation for this term is "contact", thus giving it an almost exclusively physical aspect. But that this is not the case can be seen, for example, by referring back to a text already quoted: S. 11.3-4. 28) In this text it is seen to be a mental state, and the appropriate translation "reaction" has been given to it. This translation suggests itself from the definition of the term given in the following text:
What, bhikkhus, is phassa? There are, bhikkhus, these six groups of phassa: eye-reaction (cakkhusamphassa), ear-reaction, nose-reaction, tongue-reaction, body-reaction and mind-reaction. (S. 11.3).
"Impression" could be allowed as a further translation of the term, but only where it can be taken in a sense virtually synonymous with "reaction". This is not to say that contact is excluded as a part of the meaning of the term. It is obvious that this must happen for there to be a reaction. But this must be accepted as only a subordinate meaning of the word -at least within the context of the P-s.
The matter of the translation and interpretation of phassa can give rise to a problem. In the P-s. it is stated that from the cessation of the salayatana there is the cessation of phassa; and from the cessation of the latter there is the cessation of vedana -"feeling" or "sensation". Now, if phassa meant physical contact, exclusively, it is obvious that this could not cease until after death. And, as soon as there was a new 27) See S. IV.7.
28) See above, p. 47.
Twelve terms in the Paficcasamuppada rebirth, it would begin again. Therefore, the individual would be in a situation from which there could be no escape. Physical contact cannot be stopped in this life, but the impressions or reactions to a particular object can be, or at least they can be controlled so that kammic feelings do not follow.
To further substantiate this point a text in the Nidana Samyutta may be referred to. Here Sariputta is being questioned by other wanderers about the Buddha's teaching concerning the arising of dukkha. Some recluses and brahmans, they say, who are believers in kamma (kammavada), regard dukkha as being made by oneself (sayamkata), by another (paramkata), by both, or by neither. The last group believes that it arises fortuitously (adhicca samuppanna). 
Thus, friends, those recluses and brahmans who believe in kamma, and who declare that dukkha is made by oneself, that (dukkha) depends on reaction. (And likewise for the other recluses and brahmans.) Thus, friends, those recluses... who declare that dukkha is made by oneself, it is not possible that they will experience (anything) without reaction. (And likewise for the others.) (S. II.33-34).
Here it can be seen that if the translation "contact" were used it would not properly bring out the meaning of phassa in this context; and, indeed, it would distort it. Using "reaction" it could be argued that it is the attitude of these recluses and brahmans to these several wrong views that is the reason for their living the life they do, which is diametrically opposite to the Dhamma of the Buddha. To say that dukkha is conditioned by mere contact with these views is manifestly incorrect, since Sariputta is coming into contact with them by talking to these wanderers. No, it is because he has not reacted to these different doctrines in a favourable manner that he has no dukkha. And, on a more general view -see the first paragraph of the quotation -it is the reaction of mankind as a whole which, since those individuals are not trained in the Dhamma of the Buddha, leads to so-called pleasant and unpleasant feelings towards various stimuli.
Vedana
Without argument or preamble, "feeling" or "sensation" may be used to translate this term. Of the two main definitions of vedana, the first may be given as follows: It is this definition which seems the most typical, and we shall remain with it for a while longer, particularly with reference to the so-called "lethargic sensations". In the Ciilavedalla-sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya it is said of this sensation that it is "pleasant if it is understood, but painful if it is not understood", and further that "the bias of ignorance obsesses" it. 29) How is this to be explained? The answer would seem to be a simple one. The lethargic state of the unlearned lay-man -which is boredom --is unpleasant because it invariably comes about through a state of depression, and thus most, if not all things have no attraction for him. But it does not exist because of a certain understanding that things of this world have no ultimate value; rather it is conditioned, either directly or indirectly, by something else in this world which he regards as having an intrinsic value. An instance of this would be the man who is involuntarily separated from the woman he loves. While she is present the world is a beautiful place; but in her absence things lose their meaning. The state of boredom is also characterised by the feeling of neither wanting to do something, nor wanting to do nothing. This is always a painful dilemma. But, if such lethargic people only knew it, they are on the fringe of that which is experienced by the learned bhikkhu. The latter finds neither pleasure nor displeasure in anything in this world, because he sees things as they really are -by means of perfect knowledge -and, therefore, they are in no way desirable. Thus his attitude to them is completely neutral -as opposed to lethargic.
29) M. 1.303.
Besides these two divisions of vedana, there is another division which is twofold: mental (cetasika) sensation and bodily (kayika) sensation. Of these two even an enlightened bhikkhu cannot rid himself of the latter, but he can control his reactions towards it. 30) This bhikkhu has bias neither towards repugnance nor passion nor ignorance, since he knows, as they really are, all the various aspects of vedand.
There is, however, another aspect of vedand which may be briefly referred to. In the Kitdgiri-sutta of the Majjhima it is stated that certain happy, painful and lethargic sensations lead to the increase (abhivaddhanti) of evil mental states (akusala dhamma), and the diminishing (parihayanti) of good mental states (kusala dhamma). Therefore, the Buddha instructs the bhikkhus to give up (pajahatha) these particular sensations. But, on the other hand, certain other sensations, whether happy, painful or neutral, increase good mental states, and diminish bad mental states. It follows, therefore, that the bhikkhus should dwell having entered into (upasampajja) these various sensa-
tions. 31)
The obvious point to be made from the last paragraph is that sensations as a whole were not to be given up, but only those that caused a retrograde step on the road to enlightenment.
The main point now to be emphasised is the fact that only the first definition may be seen as being strictly relevant to the P-s. In this respect it can be understood what is meant by the statement: "from the cessation of reaction (there is) the cessation of sensation". What is being talked about here is the cessation of the six sensations resulting from the six reactions gained through the six senses. And what, more exactly, is meant in this case is that the bhikkhu, realising these sensations to be put the products of the mundane world, does not react to them in the way that the unlearned lay-man would; although, of course, except in a state of trance, he cannot but realise their existence. 32)
Tanhd
The problem in translating this word is not quite the same as in the case of sankhdra. With the latter it was a matter of trying to find an equivalent English term which incorporated several connotations. As regards tanha, however, the problem is to find a term which has the correct intensity. No doubt this could be achieved by means of a phrasetranslation; but, since this would prove cumbersome, it is considered better to use the common translation of "craving". However, it must be pointed out that this word carries more connotations in it in the following texts than it would ordinarily outside the bounds of Buddhist studies. No matter how far an individual goes in order to satiate this emotion he finds that he is attempting an impossible task.
With express reference to the P-s., tanha may be defined as follows:
. However, another common definition divides tanha into three: the craving for sensual pleasure (kamatanha), for becoming (bhavatanhd) and for non-becoming (vibhavatanha).
In order to facilitate such an action as the destruction of craving, it is necessary for the true state of the world to be realised. This is achieved, for example, in section I03 of the Saldtyatana Samyutta, by referring to the body in a derogatory manner. Here it is described as a boil (ganda), and craving is then termed the "root of the boil" (gandamzla). The bhikkhus are exhorted to "dig up" (palikhatam) this root. With such a description it is not difficult to imagine the success of the exhortation.
The idea of uprooting craving leads us to the comparison of this concept with a creeper (mdaluva), or some other plant. Another graphic synonym for tanha is that of the "seamstress" (sibbani). In the Book of the Sixes, section 62, some words of the Buddha are quoted, and the following interpretation is but one of several found in the section:
... impression is one extreme, friend, the arising of impression is the second extreme, the cessation of impression is the middle, and craving is the seamstress, for craving sews (the individual) to that very becoming through rebirth. (A. 111.399-400) .
Thus, two seemingly unrelated entities, a creeper and a seamstress, are brought together through the medium of analogy. Brought together in this way, they show the fundamental power of craving. This is its ability to bind. Beings are bound to samnsara because they virtually honour craving. Doing this, they are like a "captured hare" (saso va badhito) "attached to (craving's) bonds and fetters" (samyojanasangasattaka ). 33) To use another analogy, it is said that the man who has craving for a "companion" (dutiyo, lit. "second") will for a long time be fettered to rebirth and becoming. But he who sees this "danger" (adinava), and knows that craving is responsible for the arising of dukkha, he is freed from this evil, and goes about as a Wanderer (paribbajaka). 34) The root of craving is ignorance. 35) Therefore, the obvious corollary to this is that through knowledge craving ceases. 36) Thus, being expert in the seven parts of wisdom (satta bojjhanga) 37) and the four applications of mindfulness (satipatthana), 38) the ideal bhikkhu who has seen things as they really are gives up the wish to be reborn in a more materially wealthy state. And while he is in this world he does not wish to possess those things that belong to the more wealthy members of society. He remains content in the life he has chosen, studying the Dhamma, and having all attributes, such as calmness, The two prime banes of mankind, ignorance and craving, must be destroyed if the individual is to begin his arduous task of attaining enlightenment. Through ignorance men crave for all manner of things; and the man who craves is so intent upon the fulfilment of his various ambitions that he has no awareness of the possibility that he is, in fact, deluded in his attitude towards the world. Strangely enough, there are times in some people's lives when even old-age may be desired, because of some reward or virtue that it is supposed to bring. 39) And death, also, can be a desired state for some, but not for any good reason from the Buddhist point of view. If we accept, therefore, the basic premise that there is such a phenomenon as rebirth, then it is rightly said that "craving produces the man". 40) Of a bhikkhu who has been successful in his quest, it is more correct to say that he has destroyed craving and its bond, rather than to say that he arises in this or that place. 41) No basis can be found in him on which a new rebirth could be built. 42) In short, "The destruction of craving is nibbdna". 43) Upadana Again, as was the case with tanha, a translation can be given of this word, but the qualification must be added that the English word must connote more in this Buddhist context than elsewhere in English litterature. Translations used are "grasping", "attachment" and "clinging", of which the first may be considered the best since it has a more dynamic connotation; and it has the added advantage of denoting both the act of taking the particular object and also of keeping it.
The upddana which is found in the P-s. is defined as follows: Mere suffering exists, no sufferer is found; The deeds are, but no doer of the deed is there; Nirvana is, but not the man who enters it; The path is, but no traveller on it is seen. 44) Are not both quotations stating the same fundamental view? The answer must be that this is certainly not the case. The first quotation is a criticism of the Nihilist theory, which held a totally pessimistic view of the world. Such people were condemning the giving of alms and oblations, etc., but were not offering anything substantial to take their place. In their minds there was nothing for which a sacrifice should be made, and we are merely the sum of our parts. On the other hand, the Buddhist doctrine is neither pessimistic nor nihilistic; and the 'surface' meaning, so to speak, of the second quotation is not its real meaning. Furthermore, the major difference between the Nihilists and the Buddhists was that the latter offered a very definite goal to be attained, whereas the former would have said that even to seek for a way to change one's destiny was a deluded venture.
The grasping of good works and rites entailed the belief that a shallow observance of morality was enough to obtain a better rebirth. Mind foreruns (all good) conditions, mind is chief, mind-made are they; if one speaks or acts with pure mind, because of that, happiness follows him, even as the shadow that never leaves. 45)
The grasping of the theory of the self was the view that any one of the five khandhas was the self. The argument against this would be that each of these is impermanent, whereas the self or soul was, by definition, permanent, and not subject to decay and suffering.
In the Aggivacchagotta-sutta of the Majjhima, the Buddha tells This is the message that is continually echoed throughout the whole Canon. To trust or be attached to -they come to the same thing in Buddhist thought -anything in this world is to begin on a completely false basis. The ideal bhikkhu, on the other hand, because he has no opinions on many mundane matters, grasps at nothing in this world. Because of this fact he is not worried by anything. 47) It is a matter of complete indifference to him whether he is honoured or not, since his concern or delight (drama) lies only in the knowledge that grasping is destroyed. 48) He knows that there is nothing in the world to which he can cling without being sinful (vajjava). For by such grasping, becoming is the inevitable result. 49)
Bhava
The translation "rebirth" for this word may be regarded as being, if not incorrect, at least unfortunate with reference to the P-s. Its predominant connotation is that of "becoming", but "existence", although not chosen in this work, can be looked on as a possible translation. However, there is the point that the latter does seem to bear the added implication of durability, which the Buddha was always at pains to avoid. "Rebirth" is indeed connoted in this term, but it will be put to one side, because to use it would be to have two virtually synonymous terms following one another, i.e., bhava and jcti. The main point to stress is that all things are in a state of continual change, and this is best brought out by the word "becoming".
This "becoming" can be regarded on two planes. On the one hand, there is that becoming which is evident to an enlightened person within the present life of the individual. This is a reference to the changes which are found not only in thought, but in the body and all other things. On the other hand, there is the becoming of the individual as "he" becomes in one life after the other. This, of course, makes it virtually equivalent to rebirth; but the difference between the two is that rebirth is contained within becoming, and it leads to one of the three general states: sensuous-becoming, corporeal-becoming and incorporeal-becoming. The first of these refers to becoming in the world of sense-desires (kamaloka), which includes the various hells, animals, spirits (peta) and the human realm, plus the six lower deva-realms. Corporeal-becoming includes the states resultant of the four jhanas. Therefore, although the sense organs still exist, the various evils resulting from them are reduced. Finally, the incorporeal-world includes the four spheres (ayatana) above the four jhdnas: "the sphere of the infinity of space" (akasanaicayatana), "the sphere of the infinity of consciousness" (viiiiinanaiicayatana), "the sphere of nothingness" (akiicaiiinyatana), and "the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception" (nevasanndanasainnayatana).
It must be rembered that becoming in all these worlds is dependent on upadana. Therefore, even the last sphere is not equal, by any means, to the cessation of rebirth. 50) So long as the individual is totally concerned with his own physical and mental existence, he is continually led on to becoming. Not only this, but his enjoyment, desire and craving for becoming -because he has not seen things as they really are, the arising, destruction, en- 
Jati; Jaramarana-Sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupayasa
The last two units may be dealt with in one section since neither has any real difficulties with regard to translation or interpretation. The dependence of old-age-and-death on birth is at least one part of the P-s. which Western thought would have no difficulty in understanding. It is obvious to all that birth necessarily entails a subsequent death; though even this truism has to be emphasised to some lay-people in the Buddhist text. One calls to mind the story of Kisagotami who went to the Buddha with her dead child, and asked him if he would restore life to it. The Buddha told the woman to bring him a mustard seed from a house that had not known death, and this she sought to do. Her failure in this matter then brought home to her the fact that death is the lot of all mankind, and once it has come there is no escape from it. However, the constant existence of any of the other members of the following compound is not so obvious to those who think that they can find happiness in sense-pleasures, material gains and family relationships. This is brought out well in a text found in the Udana. Here a woman, Visakha by name, is in mourning for her recently dead granddaughter. Nevertheless, when asked she expresses the desire to have many children and grand-children. This said, it is then pointed out to her that, since among such a number there would be at least one death every day, she would be in mourning forever. The conclusion from this 54) Thig., p. 128.
is that even if only one thing is held as dear in the world, there would still be dukkha. But for those who hold nothing as dear (piya), there is no dukkha. 55) Of all the t,rms that are the concern of this section, only the definition of jati, "birth", need be given; and then only to emphasise a point previously made with regard to bhava:
And what, bhikkhus, is birth? It is the birth of any beings among any class of beings, (their) origin, appearance, rebirth, the manifestation of the (five) aggregates, the attainment of the sense-organs. (S. 11.3).
Birth, therefore, is the period from conception until parturition, and thus it may be seen that is is something within the concept of bhava. Whereas many years may separate two occurrences of the former, the latter is constantly occurring.
It was -and still is, of course -the intention of the Buddhists to show the stark reality of the material world. Everything in it is suffering (dukkha), impermanent (anica) and not-self (anatta), even though it may seem to have the nature of bliss. The possessing of a body brings about innumerable griefs, pains and afflictions. The Buddha always emphasised the obvious, but he did it in such a manner that the preconceived notions prevalent in his time were cast aside as being of no value for the gaining of enlightenment. In order to facilitate this task, either he or later tradition materialised, and even at times personified, the various evils that beset mankind. For example, By death is the world afflicted, By old-age is it escorted, By the arrow of craving it is pierced, By wishes is it always fumigated.
The essence of this teaching is neither to crave for, nor to grasp after anything or anyone. There is no Justice in the world which smiles benevolently upon parent and child, man and wife, and allows the one to live for the sake of the other's happiness. There is only the automatic law of kamma, which brings to all the results of their past deeds. Neither the father can save the son, nor the wise-man the fool from the "power of death" (maccuvasam). Mourning the dead brings only greater grief for oneself. Therefore, one must see the dead as forever lost, and to understand from this that grief over a loved one's decease 
